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State Arts Councils: 
Some Items for a New Agenda 
By MONROE E. PRICE* 
THESE are no longer flush times. And one realm in which the lack 
of prosperity may prove harmful is the area of government support of 
the arts. Because the expansive middle class patronage of the l 960's is 
gone, there is a hope that the government, state and federal, will play the 
role of Maecenas. 1 Yet government intervention is now more cautious 
and more critical. The need for state support is high . Performing arts 
companies are in dire straits. 2 Artists are unemployed. Nonetheless, 
government officials at all levels are undecided as to how to proceed. In 
California, for example, after months of scrutiny by a legislative com-
mittee~ and after intensive study by the new governor and his aides, the 
proper role of the state in supporting the arts is still uncharted. A 
statute has been passed which is brief and vague, which provides the 
hint of a tone, but little more. 4 
* B.A., 1960, LLB., 1964. Yale University. Professor of Law, University of 
California, Los Angeles; Director of Advocates for the Arts, a program at UCLA de-
signed to provide legal assistance to artists and arts organizations that cannot afford _ 
counsel. The author wishes to thank Richard Katz, a third year student at UCLA 
School of Law, for his assistance in the preparation of this article. 
I. See w. BAUMOL & w. BOWEN, PERFORMING ARTS-THE ECONOMIC DILEMMA, 
347-86 (1966). 
2. See, e.g .• L.A. Times, Oct. 4, 1974, § 4, at 17, col. 3. 
3. See JOINT COMM. ON THE ARTS, CALIFORNIA STATE LEGISLATURE. REPORT 
(1975). The report can be criticized for attempting to apply too narrow an economic 
analysis to the issue of government support. 
4. See Cal. Stat. 1975, ch. 1192, at 3203-05, amendinf! Cal. Stat. 1965, ch. 149, 
§ I, at 1102-l 105. (former CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 8750-58 (West 1966) ). It is interest-
ing to compare the tone of the new statute with that of its predecessor. Former section 
8751 provided, for example, that the policy of the state was to "establish the paramount 
position of this state in the nation and in the world as a cultural center," and focused 
on the public as viewers. In contrast, the new statute states only that it "perceives that 
life in California is enriched by art." Cal. Stat. 1975, ch. 1192. § 2, at 3204. Former 
section 8750 reflected the legislative goal that as many people a~ possible should be in-
volved in the arts : "[M)any of our citizens lack the opportunity to view, enjoy, or par-
[1183] 
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This is an appropriate time to try to redefine the state role, making 
a small virtue out of the horrific vice of penury. What are presented 
here are not always specific suggestions, as such, but rather the begin-
nings of an inquiry into the proper function of the state from the 
perspective of the legal structure and some questions a state arts council 
might ask. There is much written, these days, about statutes relating to 
the arts. In the last five years, there has been a relative abundance of 
literature on various European devices to provide economic justice for 
artists--primarily the droit de suite and the droit moral." In the United 
States, there has also been . a good deal written and said about the tax 
structure and its impact on the arts. 6 There has been, perhaps, too little 
discussion of the relationship between the copyright laws7 and the 
encouragement of the arts. Nor has a great deal been written about the 
relationship between the state and the foundations and museums that 
are critical institutions in the arts. 8 What follows here are some com-
ments on particular areas in which a state arts council might be of 
utility. 
Copyright 
Let us begin with an issue that seems so federal in scope that it is 
beyond state consideration: copyright itself. Does the protection of the 
ticipate in living theatrical performances, musical concerts, operas . . . and visual arts, 
generally . . . . [W]ith increasing leisure time the practice and enjoyment of the arts 
are of increasing importance." Cal. Stat. 1965, ch. 149, § 1, at 1102. The new statute, 
in contrast, is grounded on the idea that the creative impulse is a much more limited 
and private event: "The source of art is in the natural flow of the human mind." The 
legislature also recognizes that "craft and beauty is demanding . . . ." CAL. Gov'1' 
CoDE § 8750 (West Supp. 1976). Thus, the new section implies that art is not necessar-
ily a function of leisure. The effect of a narrower focus is to convert the broad ap-
proach of former section 8751, which called for a joining "with private patrons and with 
institutions and professional organizations," into a more inward-looking mandate to 
"[a]ccept only unrestricted gifts, donations ... from private sources .... " Compare 
Cal. Stat. 1965, ch. 149, § 1, at 1103 with CAL. Gov'T CODE § 8753(m) (West Supp. 
1976). 
5. See, e.g., Price, Government Policy and Economic Security for Artists: The 
Case of the Droit de Suite, 11 YALE LJ. 1333 (1968); Sarraute, Current Theory on 
the Moral Right of Authors and Artists Under French Law, 16 AM. J. CoMP. L. 465 
(1968). 
6. See, e.g., Hearings on General Tax Reform Before the House Comm. on Ways 
and Means, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 15, at 6052 (1973) (testimony of Kyran McGrath, 
director of American Ass'n of Museums). 
7. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1970 & Supp. IV, 1974). 
8. The leading work in this area is M. FREMONT-SMITH, FOUNDATIONS AND Gov-
ERNMENT: STATE AND FEDERAL LAw AND SUPER.VISION (1965). See also Fremont-
Smith, Impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 on State Supervisio11 of Charities, 8 
HARV. J. LBGIS. 537 (1971). 
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expression of ideas through the copyright laws sufficiently encourage the 
arts to justify the reliance placed in that mechanism? Congress has the 
power, under the Constitution, to employ copyright laws to fulfill the 
rather agreeable goal of encouraging the arts in society.9 For most of 
the nation's history, copyright has been the primary technique available 
to foster creativity. The notion has been that creativity would be 
inhibited if an author or artist were not assured, in some way, that a 
writing, painting or sculpture would, if successful, bring financial re-
turn.10 
Incentives for creativity and the role of the government in the 
creative process have changed. The most important development has 
been government support of a substantial amount of creative activity. 
Much writing, though perhaps not the writing that is most worthy of 
enduring acceptance, is under government contract or grant ·or financed 
by foundations indirectly supported through the tax system. The pri-
mary incentive for the writing is usually the initial award, not possible 
subsequent fruits . Indeed, writings produced under hire for the federal 
government are, by statute, in the public domain, 11 and some federal 
agencies have indicated that this treatment is also appropriate for studies 
produced for them under contract.12 Similarly, universities have pro-
posed that work created by their faculties should be copyrighted in the 
name of the academy. While this proposal is designed to enable the 
university to reap the harvest of its professors' productivity, there is 
implicit the suggestion that a salary or grant from the unversity is a 
sufficient goad to creativity. All this is not to say that copyright 
protection is unessential; rather, its place among the tools available to 
government should be reassessed. 13 
Naturally, there should be proper attribution of a person's work, 
and the integrity of that work should be preserved. Copyright, how-
ever, is not based on an insistence that the original creator of a visual 
9. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
10. Cf. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966). 
11. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 8 (Supp. 1976). 
12. See, e.g., 30 Fed. Reg. 9408-09 (1965). The statement of policy promulgated 
by the Office of Education under the Department of Health, Education and Welfare pro-
vides: "Material produced as a result of any research activity undertaken with any fi-
nancial assistance through contract or project grant from the Office of Education will 
be placed in the public domain. Materials so released will be available to conventional 
outlets of the private sector for their use." Id. 
13. See Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, 
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970); Tyerman, The 
Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection for Published Books: A Reply to Pro-
fessor Breyer, 18 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1100 (1971). 
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work or a play or a piece of music be acknowledged for the work 
done.14 Certainly, a copyist should not feel free to alter the original in a 
way that places the creator in a false light or deleteriously changes or 
defaces the work. These tort issues, however, are independent of the 
essence of copyright, namely the monopoly, fur a period of time, in 
the expression of a work. 
Perhaps there should be alternate structures to compensate original 
creators as society uses the product of their work. Since 1909, any 
person who has permitted a record to be made of a composition has 
thereby compulsorily authorized any record company to record the same 
composition or arrangement of the composition at the legislatively set 
royalty rate of two cents per record. 15 Although the level of the royalty 
has been subject to attack, 16 there seems to be general acceptance of the 
idea of a compulsory license in this context. In the area of television, 
the use of broadcast signals by cable operators has also given rise to 
compulsory licensing.17 Supreme Court decisions aside, 18 the Congress 
will probably enact legislation, following the Federal Communications 
Commission's recommendation, which would authorize cable systems to 
use broadcast signals without specific permission, but which would 
require them to pay a percentage of their gross as a royalty for the 
privilege. 
In the case of recording and television broadcast signals, the author 
does not control the dissemination of his ideas. There is, however, 
financial return for their use. One might ask why television signals are 
different from plays or books or paintings. If the cable analogy were 
applied to books, an author would be required to permit any publisher 
to print and distribute a work; the author would be entitled to a preset 
14. For example, in Mazer v. Stein, the Supreme Court observed: "The economic 
philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is 
. . . that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance 
public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors . . .. " Mazer v. Stein, 347 
U.S. 201, 219 (1954) . And in Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, the Court noted that "the 
primary object in conferring the monopoly lie[s] in· the general benefits derived by the 
public from the labors of authors." Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 
(1932) . 
15. See 17 u.s.c. § l(e) (1970); 1 M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT§ 108.4 (1975) . 
16. Cf. Lorimer, 2¢ Plain, Why Pay More?, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 561 (1963). 
17. Cf. Note, Cable Television and Copyright Royalties, 83 YALE L.J. 554 (1974) ; 
26 VAND. L. REV. 1314 (1973). This extension of the infringement concept is incorpo-
rated in a bill recently passed by the Senate. See S. 22, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § § 111 
(c) -(d) (1975). 
18. See Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly Corp. 
v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968) . 
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royalty figure, but the pace and method of marketing could not be 
controlled. Similarly, a composer would not be able to use copyright to 
control when and by whom a musical composition was played. Nor 
would an artist, particularly an artist who had authorized a reproduction 
of a visual work, prohibit others from doing so. It should be remem-
bered, of course, that the artist, author, or composer would have the 
right to protect against injury to the work or the creator's reputation. 
The scraps and particles of compulsory license are important to 
note because of the adverse impact of copyright laws on the flow of 
information, on education, and perhaps on creativity itself.19 At some 
point the nourishment provided by copyright, the incentive to a particu-
lar artist to create, is offset by the cost to the community of less than free 
access to the creation. In the realm of ideas there is a social interest in 
widespread dissemination and in encouraging entrepreneurship in publi-
cation. 
As far as government policy is concerned, and as far as the arts 
council's policy is involved, some tentative steps should be taken. Cali-
fornia's new arts council legislation, for example, provides that "the 
people of the state desire to encourage and nourish [artistic] skills 
wherever they occur, to the benefit of all."20 Basic to that policy is the 
question of how the state or the federal government can best encourage 
and support the arts. If the current scheme for the establishment of 
copyright and the compensation of artists is not the best mechanism for 
such encouragement, changes ought to be considered. Should the state 
propose a fund in lieu of copyright that would support artists generally 
rather than reward a given artist in particular? Should the state require 
that there be compulsory reproduction rights in works that are created 
pursuant to a grant from the state? Should the state require that there 
be exhibition of or other access to works that are produced under state 
subsidy? Should the state aid artists in developing a mechanism for 
joint licensing, akin to the mechanism that is employed by musicians? 
Although the ultimate approaches lie with the federal government, there 
is much that California can do to serve as a laboratory for new ideas. 21 
19. See Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of 
Free Speech and Press?, 17 U.C.L.A.L. R.Ev. 1180 (1970). 
20. Cal. Stat. 1975, ch. 1192, § 2, at 3204. 
21. For discussions of the role the state can play in this area see Goldstein v. Cal-
ifornia, 412 U.S. 546 (1973); Brown, Publication and Preemption in Copyright Law: 
Elegiac Reflections on Goldstein v. California, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1022 (1975) ; Note, 
Misappropriation : A Retreat from the Federal Patent and Copyright Preemption Doc-
trine, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 239 (1974) . 
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The Right of Exhibition 
Quite close to the copyright issues just described is what might be 
called a public right to have an important work exhibited. At present, 
owners of private collections must base their claims of ownership on 
uninhibited property rights in works that may be acknowledged, quite 
generally, to .be of importance to the community at large. Under our 
present rather modest incursions into strict property rights, there may be 
a state claim that an ·owner may not arbitrarily destroy a valuable 
work. 22 If an individual acquired the Watts Towers, there might be 
some limitation on the power to pull them down. Environmental 
considerations now forbid aimless marring of other aesthetic features of 
the state, such as the coastline.23 
From this incursion it might in tum be possible to say that there is 
a public right to share reasonably in the aesthetic value of a work of 
art. 24 For example, traditional European concepts require that owner-
ship of a Rembrandt does not include a right to deface the painting.26 
Such a limitation on ownership does not necessarily spring from the 
work itself; it might be found in the relationship of the work to the 
community. The object is part of the body of society's cultural wealth. 
One individual, by virtue of temporary custody of the work, does not 
have the right to mar or destroy it. In addition to this limitation there 
should be a right of access for important exhibitions and scholarly 
purposes. 
What is suggested here is not a random right of access, but rather a 
carefully controlled power to ensure that works are not totally or arbi-
trarily withheld from public view. The implementation of such a right 
would, of course, involve enormous practical problems, such as deciding 
what is reasonable, . who is to make the relevant determinations, and 
which museums are eligible, but these are problems a state council 
might pursue. The right of access would have to be reasonable; it could 
22. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CoDE, ch. 8a, §§ 205-1.0 to 207-20.0 (Williams 1971 & 
Supp. 1975); cf. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §§ 5003, 5020-33 (West 1972 & Supp. 1975); 
Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in 
First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1482, 1483 n.5 (1975). 
23. See CAL. PuB. RES. CODE§§ 27000-650 (West Supp. 1975). 
24. Cf. Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 
(1970). 
25. Cf. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, 
Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554 ( 1940); Sarraute, Current Theory on the 
Moral Right of Authors and Artists Under French Law, 16 AM. J. COMP. L . 465 
(1968). 
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not overly inconvenience the owner's enjoyment of the work or force 
additional costs upon him. The risk of loss or damage would, of 
course; fall upon the museum displaying the work, and no work could 
be borrowed more often than, say, once every five years. 
The right to exhibit is related to the restraint of exportation or the 
protection of the cultural partrimony of a state or nation. ~11 In Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union, government permission is required for the 
export of an object of cultural importance created before 1945.~7 The 
government of France •has the power to exercise a right of first refusal or 
to forbid the exportation of a work. 211 Generally these powers are 
exercised to keep a work within a nation's borders, but it is unclear why 
it would be considered worthwhile to detain a work within a nation but 
to withhold from the people of the state the right to see it. In other 
words, restraints on export sales seem related to requirements that a 
work be exhibited, and in terms of property rights, the limit on sale is 
conceptually related to a duty to allow access. 
A right to access for exhibition seems much more responsive to the 
people's needs than does the limited right of access said to exist under 
French and German law. In Germany and France, the artist has a right 
of access only to obtain a photograph of his work. ~n Although it is not 
clear on this point, the German law is interpreted to mean that the 
owner of a work has the power to control exhibition unless there is a 
contract specifically vesting that right in the artist. ~0 The right to 
obtain a photograph, recently provided by statute in France,=11 recogniz-
es the importance of documentation but does not go far enough toward 
supporting scholarship or public education. 
A right of exhibition would also help to liberate the professional 
staffs of museums. At present, museums are almost wholly dependent 
upon the favor of patrons for loans of works; because there is no access 
to the body of a nation's works, there is a need for an acquisitions 
policy. A right to exhibit might result in a reduction of financial 
26. Note, The Protection of A rt in Transnational Law, 7 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 689, 
705 (1974) . 
27. Interviews with staff of the Max Planck Institute, in Munich, Germany. Aug. 
1975. 
28. Note, The Protection of Art in Tra11s11atio11;i[ Law, 7 VAND. J . TRANS. L. 689, 
706-07 (I 97 4) . 
29. Interviews with staff of the M ax Planck Institute, in Munich, Germany, Aug. 
1975. 
30. Id. 
3 I. Id. 
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pressure on museums. If museums had access to works of art for 
exhibition purposes, the selection of trustees of the museums might be 
based on broader grounds. 
There are two tax aspects of a right to exhibit which should be 
mentioned. In England there is presently wide-spread discussion of a 
personal property tax on works of art that exceed $250;000 in value. 
The administration of such a tax might include an exemption for works 
loaned to public museums for exhibition. In the United States prior to 
1969 some courts implied that the owner of a painting could take a 
charitable deduction for the value of the work for the period of exhibi-
tion. ~2 One could conceive of a regime which extended the rationale for 
this implication to require that the owner of a work could av•oid exhibi-
tion only by the payment of a tax. 
This last idea may be one whose time has not come. Perhaps its 
time should never come, but it is the kind of venture about which a state 
arts council could inquire and in which it could efficiently seek to 
experiment. 
Museums and State Law Enforcement 
A legitimate and critical concern relevant to state policy in the arts 
is the behavior of nonprofit institutions, particularly museums, estab-
lished within the state. The first complex issue is that of ensuring that 
museums and other charitable institutions, including foundations, live up 
to their responsibilities. When Professor Kenneth Karst wrote his arti-
cle on state and federal supervision of charitable trusts and charitable 
corporations little more than a decade ago,33 his list of potential enfor-
cers of such trusts purposely excluded as a supervising litigant the 
general beneficiary.34 The growing role of the Internal Revenue Service 
was noted, but noted with suspicion, because the code, Karst stated, was 
32. See, e.g., Passailaigue v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 682 (M.D. Ga. 1963). 
This view, which was disputed by the Internal Revenue Service, was foreclosed by Con-
gress in the 1969 Tax Reform Act. See 26 U.S.C. § 170(f) (1970); H.R. REP. No. 
413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Treasury Regulation section 1.170-1 (d) provides: 
"Section 170(f) and this subparagraph have no application in respect of a transfer of 
an undivided present interest in property. For example, a contribution of an undivided 
one-quarter interest in a painting with respect to which the donee is entitled to posses-
sion during three months of each year shall be treated as made upon the receipt by the 
donee of a formally executed and acknowledged deed of gift." Treas. Reg. § 1.170-1 (d) 
(2)(b), T.D. 7207. 
33. See Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State 
Responsibility, 73 HARV. L. REV. 433 ( 1960) [hereinafter cited as Karst]. 
34. See id. at 449. 
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"not originally designed to prevent breaches of fiduciary duty, but rather 
to prohibit the use of the exemption as a device for private gain."35 
Professor Karst described the limited function of cotrustees,36 of found-
ers, and of substantial donors37 in enforcing the terms of charitable 
trusts. The preeminent role of the state attorneys general was also 
described, although the article related in detail how the structure and 
budgeting of their offices make them unequal to the task. 38 
To remedy the need for closer surveillance of charitable trusts and 
charitable corporations, Professor Karst suggested a state board of pri-
vate charities.39 Suoh a board would maintain a registry of all charities 
operating in the state, collect and evaluate periodic reports, investigate 
possible breaches of fiduciary duty, and seek remedial acti'on in the 
appropriate court. More affirmatively, the board would assist charity 
managers so that they could bring their acitivites into a closer harmony 
with the social and economic needs of the people of the state. Such a 
board could assist in the regeneration of obsolete charities and the 
consolidation of small and inefficient ones. The board would develop 
and enforce standards for solicitation and cooperate with state and 
federal tax officials to ensure that no abuses resulted in the exploitation 
of the exemption for purely private gain. 40 
The Karst solution is an elegant and elaborate one, but no state 
has acceded to its charms. Some states have strengthened the office of 
the attorney general and have established registries of trusts. 41 From 
time to time, the officials in a particular state have become increasingly 
vigilant in monitoring adherence to charitable purposes and improving 
deaccession procedures. Generally, the pattern at the state level re-
mains virtually the same as it was in 1960 and for many years before 
that. As Karst noted, however, "the continued existence of the institu-
tions of private charity will depend in considerable measure on public 
confidence in the efficiency of those institutions. "42 The state arts 
council should be responsible for inspecting the efficiency of museums 
and recommending ways of improving their policies and thereby their 
performance. Possible responses include enlarging the class of persons 
35. See id. at 443. 
36. See id. at 443-45. 
37. See id. at 445-49. 
38. See id. at 449-60. 
39. See id. at 476. 
40. See id. at 477. 
41. See Kutner & Koven, Charitable Trust Legislation in the Several States, 61 
Nw. U.L. REV. 411, 413-20 (1966). 
42. Id. at 434-35. 
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entitled to enforce a charitable trust or broadening the scope of interest 
of an agency exercising surveillance over charitable institutions. 
A special logic and a misplaced fear underlie the rule excluding 
beneficiaries from the list of possible enforcers of charitable trusts. The 
logic begins with the definition of a charitable trust and its fortunate 
insistence on a broad and indefinite class of beneficiaries.43 Since the 
beneficiaries are indefinite, there is no specific self-interest that can be 
counted upon for the enforcement of the trust. H A more official 
watchd·og, it is often said, is necessary.45 As a consequence, the state 
attorney general is usually given the responsibility of protecting the 
interests of the uninformed beneficiary.46 The next step in the reason-
ing is protective of the trustees and the state official: because the state 
attorney general has the responsibility of protecting beneficiaries, the 
latter should be precluded from enforcing the trust on their own behalf, 
unless they have a specific interest that is more precise than that of the 
average beneficiary (the average museum goer, in the case of a mu-
seum).47 
These arguments against suits by beneficiaries have a long histo-
ry. 48 Beneficiaries are barred and should be barred, it is said, because 
widespread citizen litigation would unduly harass trustees. 49 In a case 
involving the Barnes Museum, 110 for example, the court dismissed the 
action brought by a newspaper reporter to enforce a charitable trust, 
even though the reporter had the consent of the state attorney general. 
In explaining this result, the court quoted an early decision: 
There are many authorities in England and in this country which 
deny the right of private parties . . . to compel the performance 
of a duty to the public. The reason is, that if one individual may 
interpose, any other may, and as the decision in one individual case 
woulc;l be no bar to any other, there would be no end to litigation 
43. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 348, 364 (1959); G.G. BOGERT 
& G.T. BOGERT, HANDBOOK. OF THE I.Aw OF TRUSTS§ 55, at 206 (5th ed. 1973 ). 
44. See A. ScoTT, I.Aw OF TRUSTS § 391, at 697-700 (abr. 1960) [hereinafter 
cited as Scorr]. 
45. See, e.g., id. 
46. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391, comments a-f (1959); Scorr, 
&upra note 44, § 391, at 697. 
47. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391, comment c (1959) (the min-
ister of a church for the benefit of which a charitable trust is created can bring suit 
against the trustee for enforcement of the trust). 
48. Cf. ScoTT, supra note 44, § 391, at 697-98. 
49. See id. § 399, at 699. 
50. Wiegand v. Barnes Foundation, 374 Pa. 149, 97 A.2d 81 (1953). 
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and strife. The general laws of order so necessary to good govern-
ment forbid anything like this.111 
1193 
It is also argued that a system that depended on beneficiaries for 
enforcement of charitable trusts would founder because no single benefi-
ciary would have enough of an interest in the performance of the trust to 
meet the litigation costs involved in obtaining adherence to the trust's 
terms.~2 
These last two arguments are now coming under increasing scruti-
ny. Charitable institutions are not the only public institutions that wish 
to avoid the hazards of frequent litigation by self-appointed attorneys , 
general. There is a certain harmony about an institutionalized system 
of checks and balances, but we are now in an era of citizens on white 
horses, a time when accountability has become the watchword. It may 
be argued, of course, that it is unappealing to divert funds from the 
operation of the charity to the defense of litigation, but the argument 
applies as much to public governmental functions as to private charit-
able ones. In addition, beneficiaries as a class are now more capable of 
representing their own interests, primarily as a result of the growth of 
public interest law firms. These new organizations, also children of 
charity, have as their raison d'etre the representation of the unrepresent-
ed, isolated people who ,have an interest in obtaining the services that, in 
theory, are due them.118 
51. Id. at 153, 97 A.2d at 83, quoting Buck Mountain Coal Co. v. Lehigh Coal 
& Navigation Co., 50 Pa. 91 , 99 (1865). 
52. See Karst, supra note 33. 
53. Few cases have recognized the need for reexamining the historic policy of re-
fusing to permit beneficiaries, as such, to sue to enforce a trust. The broadest breach 
in traditional doctrine seems to be taking place in New Jersey. In one case, citizens 
attempted to prevent the local hospital from changing its location from its downtown 
site to a nearby suburb. The citizens contended that the charitable trust had been cre-
ated for the purpose of ministering to the residents of the city, especially the sick poor, 
and that the aid was to be administered in physical facilities located within the munici-
pal limits. Paterson v. Paterson Gen. Hosp., 97 N.J. Super. 514, 235 A.2d 487 (Ch. 
Div. 1967); cf. Township of Cinna.minson v. First Camden Nat'I Bank & Trust Co., 99 
N.J. Super. 115, 238 A.2d 701 (Ch. Div. 1968). In Township of Cinnaminson the set-
tlor had established a trust to construct a library for Cinnaminson Township. In 1945, 
a court had yielded to the trustees who wished to use the funds for the enhancement 
of two nearby libraries instead. In the 1960's, population patterns changed; the town-
ship built a library, and its citizens wished the return of the Lippincott Trust. They 
sued for the annulment of the previous cy pres decree. Id. at 119-23, 238 A.2d at 703-
04. 
In each case, the court upheld the right of the citizens to bring the action and also 
upheld the decision of the trustees. The court in Paterson was firm in its reasoning: 
"[I]n this State, and throughout ,the country as a whole, supervision of the administra-
tion of charities had been neglected." 97 N.J. Super. at 527, 235 A.2d at 495. "While 
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There are seven states in which beneficiaries are authorized by 
statute to enforce charitable trusts, though the language is vague in 
almost every case. 54 What is astonishing to the reader of Scott55 and the 
believer in traditional trust law is the absence of harassment of trustees 
in these states. 56 Explanations are possible. It may be that the states 
that have given the beneficiary the right to sue are not populated by 
public supervision of the administration of charities remains inadequate, a liberal rule 
as to the standing of a plaintiff to complain about the administration of a charitable 
trust or charitable corporation seems decidedly in the public interest." Id. at 528, 235 
A.2d at 495. 
In no other recent decision has a court been as specific as the New Jersey court 
in extending the standing of citizens to enforce charitable trusts, but there are other 
straws in the wind. A recent California case indicates that some state courts may be 
reaching a similar result by bending the traditional rule that beneficiaries cannot enforce 
a charitable trust unless they can show a specific interest which is different from that 
of any vague beneficiary. See note 47 & accompanying text supra. Thus, it may be 
that the "special interest" exception is being expanded. In one recent California case, 
a settlor had donated land near Escondido for the benefit of its boy and girl scouts. The 
trust conveyed the land to the City of F.scondido, altering the nature of the restriction. 
The Council of Boy Scouts, on behalf of its members, sued to enforce the donor's intent. 
The court held that the plaintiffs had standing to bring suit against the holder of the 
trust property. The court found that "the need of the boys and girls for representation 
is at least as great as that of the general public. We think that interest can best be 
met by those ... directly concerned .... " San Diego Court Council v. City of Es-
condido, 14 Cal. App. 3d 189, 196, 92 Cal. Rptr. 186, 190 (1971) . The boy scouts 
of Escondido constitute a narrower class than its museum goers, and for that reason, 
the case may not provide persuasive authority for the standing of museum goers to en-
force charitable trusts. But it would not be surprising if based on that case, a California 
court in the future gave standing to a member of a museum who stated an interest more 
specific than residence in the community where the museum was located. 
In Stern. v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'/ Training School, a recent federal case having 
potentially far-reaching effects concerning the fiduciary duties of trustees of nonprofit, 
charitable organizations, the plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf of the patients 
of Sibley Hospital in Washington, D.C., to "challenge the conduct of the trustees oper-
ating this charitable institution on a theory of breach of trust." Stern v. Lucy Webb 
Hayes Nat'! Training School, 367 F. Supp. 536, 540 (D.D.C. 1973 ) . In the decision 
following the trial on the merits, the court noted: 'The management of a non-profit 
charitable hospital imposes a severe obligation upon its trustees. A hospital such as 
Sibley is not closely regulated by any public authority, it has no responsibility to file 
financial reports, and its Board is self-perpetuating. . . . [A]nd the patients Jack mean-
ingful participation in the Hospital's affairs." 381 F. Supp. 1003, 1019 (D.D.C. 1974). 
This same observation applies equally to organizations such as museums and those whom 
they are ostensibly intended to serve. 
54. See Kutner & Koven, Charitable Trust Legislation in the Several States, 61 
Nw. U.L. REV. 411, 423-25 (1966). 
55. See notes 44-49 & accompanying text supra. 
56. An analogy can be drawn between the standing of a beneficiary to enforce 
a charitable trust and the recently liberalized standing of listeners to intervene and chal-
lenge the performance of a broadcaster when his license is scheduled for renewal. See 
Office of Communications of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 
1966). 
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interesting charitable trusts or charitable corporations. Alternatively, it 
is possible that the personality of the citizenry of those states is not 
marked by the propensity for litigiousness that is found elsewhere. 
Finally, though least likely, it could be that the existence of statues 
which provide such an onerous enforcement mechanism has encouraged 
the trustees to stick more closely to the terms of the trust. The absence 
of the largest states from the list suggests that one of these explanations 
may indeed have some relationship to the phenomenon of absence of 
suits by beneficiaries. 
Beneficiary enforcement does not necessarily mean harassment, but 
it can mean more frequent and less controlled occasions for judicial 
scutiny of trustee action. It is important to emphasize that the broaden-
ing of eligibility to invoke the judicial remedy does not, at least in 
theory, change the standard of performance expected of a trustee. The 
discretionary latitude of a board remains the same although the occa-
sions for scrutiny to determine whether there is a breach of fiduciary 
duty become more frequent. Beneficiaries might sue museum trustees 
to prevent illegal acts, to enjoin the disposition of work at less than fair 
market value, to enjoin acts in violation of the terms of a trust, to stop 
acts of self-dealing, or to recovery from a trustee who has benefitted 
from an opportunity that should have been the museum's. There is, of 
course, the danger that expanding the occasions for scrutiny would 
make a board more timid or would discourage qualified persons from 
serving, but legislatures and courts could fashion limits to remedies that 
would render such results less likely. Beneficiary suits, for example, 
could be limited to injunctive relief, foreclosing the possibility of the 
imposition of liability upon the trustees as individuals. 
A second focus for change in enforcement patterns relates to the 
current legislative debates and judicial activity concerning the federal 
tax exemptions of museums as charitable institutions. 57 The state arts 
57. On the general question of charitable deductions see Andrews, Personal De-
ductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309 (1972); Rabin, Charitable 
Trusts and Charitable Deductions, 41 N.Y.U.L REV. 912, 920-25 (1966); Sacks, The 
Role of Philanthropy: An Institutional View, 46 VA. L. REV. 516, 524 (1960); Surrey, 
Federal Income Tax Reform: The Varied Approaches Necessary to Replace Tax Ex-
penditures with Direct Governmental Assistance, 84 HARV. L. REV. 352 (1970) [herein-
after cited as Surrey]. For debates over tax expenditures see Bittker, Accounting for 
Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the National Budget, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 244 (1969); Surrey 
& Hellmuth, The Tax Expenditure Budget-Response to Professor Bittker, 22 NAT'L TAX 
J. 528 (1969); Bittker, The Tax Expenditure Budget-A Reply to Professors Surrey and 
Hellmuth, 22 NAT'L TAX J, 538 (1969). For discussions of related problems see Vick-
rey, One Economist's View of Philanthropy, in PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC POLICY 31 
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council could ask a similar question about state exemptions. Two 
current issues are of importance. First, the Internal Revenue Service 
has begun to act on the idea that its duty to preserve the fisc means that 
it has some obligation to examine the conduct and policy of exempt 
institutions and to ensure that those entities are not used as shields for 
private transactions. Second, as a result of the debates leading to the 
1969 Tax Reform Act, Professor Surrey's analysis of federal tax re-
form58 has taken root. 
In some recent cases, individual c1t1zens have successfully chal-
lenged the issuance of exemptions to organizations whose activities con-
travene federal legislative or constitutional nonns, ''11 primarily because of 
racial discrimination. The decisions in these cases have important rami-
fications for exempt institutions generally. They enlarge the field of per-
sons entitled to enforce or otherwise affect the conduct of charitable 
trusts. It is one thing for the Internal Revenue Service to try to shape or 
influence the policy of exempt organizations or for the state attorney 
general to enforce certain provisions of a trust; it is quite another when a 
large class of citizens can compel the appropriate official to take action 
consistent with his responsibility. 60 
The implications of the exemption cases for state policies are 
interesting. In these days of shifting judicial climates, the cases may be 
(F. Dickinson ed. 1962); Stone, Federal Tax Support of Charitics and Other Exempt 
Organizations: The Need for a National Policy, 20 U. So. CAL. 1968 TAX INST. 27; 
Wolfman, Federal Tax Policy and the Support of Science, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 171 
(1965 ). 
58. See Surrey, supra note 57. 
59. See, e.g., Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.). aff'd sub nom. Coit 
v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971 ). In Green, a three-judge court held that "Federal tax 
exemptions and deductions are generally not available for activities contrary to declared 
Federal public policy," at least when those activities contravene an impressive tradition 
of policy against government support for racial segregation in the delivery of education. 
330 F. Supp. at 1154. At issue was the validity of exemptions and deductions for segre-
gated academies that were the creatures of Brown v. Board of Education. 347 U.S. 483 
(1954). Several months after Green, another three-judge court in the District of 
Columbia held that the deductibility of contributions to a fraternal organization that dis-
criminated against blacks violated Title VJ of the I 964 Civil Rights Act. The court 
recognized the standing of an individual potential member to force the secretary of the 
treasury to deny subsidies to an organization that violated federal antisegregation pol-
icy. See McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972) . 
60. In this sense, Green and McGlotten are federal versions of Ames v. Attorney 
General, 332 Mass. 246, 124 N.E.2d 511 (1955). In Amcs, the plaintiffs unsuccessfully 
sought to force the state attorney general to view more favorably their interpretation 
of the trustees' responsibility in a case in which a large botanical library and herbarium 
was to be moved from Boston's Arnold Arboretum to the premises of Harvard College. 
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idiosyncratic and the doctrine involved incapable of expansion. 61 On 
the other hand, these decisions are part of a family that includes Tank 
Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,62 in which 
the Internal Revenue Service disallowed a business deduction for the 
payment of fines for illegal acts. 63 It may be that tax enforcers, on their 
own or with judicial prodding, become even more assertive in the 
charitable organization field, on the basis of Green v. Connally64 and its 
progeny. They might prospectively enlarge the class of activities con-
travening public policy as expressed in statute, constitution or treaty, 
which are inconsistent with the retention of exempt status. States might 
do the same in accord with Pitts v. Department of Revenue,65 with 
respect to both income and property tax exemptions. 66 
The issue, of course, is important to museums and similar charit-
able organizations only if these cases imply a range of substantive stan-
dards that the tax authority can and should enforce. The nature and 
extent of such standards are largely a matter of speculation. Racial 
discrimination may be sui generis, and the actions of the courts and the 
Internal Revenue Service in recent cases may represent the outer limit 
that can be expected. The federal policy against racial discrimination is 
more sharply etched and stronger in its constitutional underpinning than 
other policies affecting exempt institutions such as museums. There 
are, however, several museum-related activities which could give rise to 
a challenge to an exemption. Such a challenge might be mounted if it 
can be established that: (1) a museum's employment practices are 
61. The Internal Revenue Service, however, did adopt the holding of Green in 
Rev. Rul. 447, 1971-2 CuM. BULL. 230. 
62. 356 U.S. 30 (1958). 
63. See M. Fremont-Smith & A. Yarmolinsky, Preserving the Private Voluntary 
Sector: A Proposal for a Public Advisory Commission, May 9, 1975 (draft paper pre-
pared for the Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs). 
64. See note 59 supra. 
65. 333 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Wis. 1971). See note 66 infra. 
66. Given a substantive standard that should be critically relevant, within the 
meaning of Green and McG/otten, to the continuance of the exemption or the honoring 
of a deduction, those cases hold that anyone who suffers injury in fact, economic or oth-
erwise, can bring suit, so long as "the interest sought to be protected by the complainant 
is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or 
constitutional guarantee in question." Association of Data Processing Service Organiza-
tions, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). A general interest in the subject matter 
is insufficient, but individual group members who are specifically affected do suffer ade-
quate injury. Compare Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), with United States 
v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973). For charitable institutions, the class to be protected 
by the exemption statute might include those very beneficiaries who are excluded from 
enforcing the trust under state law. 
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discriminatory on the basis of either race or sex; (2) the self-perpetuat-
ing board of a public institution has discriminated systematically in its 
self-perpetuation on the basis of race or sex; (3) a museum's policy 
denies adequate access to interested members of the public; (4) a 
museum's acquisition policy or practice systematically contravenes fed-
eral policy, as expressed in statutes or treaties; (5) a museum demon-
strates a pattern or practice involving complicity in overvaluation of 
contributions for the purpose of obtaining charitable deductions;67 or 
(6) the admissions policy of a museum makes it impossible for poor 
people to attend. 68 
State Policy and Governance of Museums 
Enforcement mechanisms are a faulty substitute for structural re-
form. Enhancement of enforcement may be, in fact, only a technique 
67. Each of these conditions presents special problems that make it less than likely 
that a court would uphold an action .to force investigation of the exemption or that the 
IRS would or should act on its own. The employment discrimination situation presents 
the easiest case in terms of the existing precedents, though it may be argued that the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides an exclusive remedy, as well as setting forth the sub-
stantive standard. In the case of a board of directors, standing may be denied because 
it is unclear what statute should be the basis for determing who is arguably within the 
zone of protected interests. The IRS, of course, could act on its own by issuing a ruling. 
The same problem occurs in the case of access to the museum, though on that issue there 
is already developing IRS case law. With respect to an object illegally acquired in con-
travention of a treaty, it is more likely that a person or group could assert the specific 
zone of interest that would provide standing. 
68. Recent cases demonstrate that the potential for litigation on these questions 
is not totally imaginary. In In re Estate of Bishop, the famed Bishop Trust was before 
the state supreme court for an accounting. One justice stated that the foundation ought 
to change the criteria for appointment to the board and for admission to its school in 
light of Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971). See In re Estate of 
Bishop, 53 Haw. 604, 616, 449 P.2d 670, 677 (1972) (Abe, J., concurring). The trust 
document provided that only Protestants should be appointed to the self-perpetuating 
board, and the board had interpreted the trust document as restricting admission to chil-
dren of native Hawaiian descent. In a federal case in Wisconsin, the court extended 
Green by granting an injunction against a state taxing authority, forbidding it from 
granting preferential tax treatment in the form of income and property exemptions to 
organizations that discriminate on the basis of race. The court held that a "tax exemp-
tion constitutes affirmative, significant state action in an equal protection context where 
racial discrimination ... is claimed." Pitts v. Department of Revenue, 333 F. Supp. 
662, 668 (E.D. Wis. 1971 ) . 
Litigants have tried to use the exemption conferral as the basis of suit in circum-
stances not involving charges of racial discrimination. Thus far these attempts have 
failed. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Eastern Ky. Welfare 
Rights Organization v. Simon, 506 F .2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Bright v. Isenbarger, 
314 F . Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ind. 1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 412 (1971). Increasingly, it may 
be expected, litigants attempting to require trustees to conform to their notions of what 
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for triggering reform; as a consequence, an arts council might find it 
advisable to concern itself more directly, with the form of governance of 
museums. The present condition is that museums characteristically 
represent a context in which a public trust, largely publicly supported, is 
vested in individuals over whom the public has virtually no control. 
Wealth and status, independent of other characteristics, can fin,d their 
place. While there is nothing wrong with those characteristics, it is 
wrong to have a system of museums dependent on wealth, just as it 
would be wrong to have a system of public education dependent on 
wealth. The critical point is to develop a tradition in which collection 
and donation of gifts to museums are not accompanied by expectations 
of control. 
A long-range inquiry into the state's role in affecting the gover-
nance of museums would start with a look at the existing kinds of 
techniques for governance. Within California, there are museums that 
are administered directly by a city council;69 there are museums that are 
totally public, but have a commission-type board;70 and there are mu-
suems, like the Los Angeles County Museum of Art, that are a unique 
mixture of public and private features, with the county paying operating 
expenses and a private governing board making policy regarding acquis-
itions and exhibitions.71 We need to know what difference the mode of 
constitutes the public interest will be using the exemption as a technique to gain entry 
into court. The vitality of this approach will be limited, but it is difficult at this point 
to say what the limits will be. 
69. The director of the Long Beach museum, for example, is appointed by the city 
council. The museum has no board of directors, and decisions except those of major 
financial nature are made by the director in consultation with the museum staff. The 
Long Beach Municipal Arts Commission serves in an advisory capacity. The city coun-
cil provides funds for the operation and maintenance of the museum, along with a cer-
tain amount for exhibitions. The museum has three support groups which provide both 
money and hours. Since the Long Beach museum emphasizes traveling exhibitions, 
there is only a small acquisition fund, which comes mostly from outside sources. See 
LoNG BEACH, CAL., MUNI. CODE§ 2340 (1955). 
70. The Barnsdall Gallery, for example, is controlled by the Municipal Arts De-
partment of the City of Los Angeles. It is presently the city's only municipally con-
trolled operating center for exhibition. The gallery is under the direction of an art coor-
dinator, who is appointed pursuant to a civil service examination. Funding comes from 
city taxpayers by way of appropriations of the city council, and supplementary funds 
are provided by a supportive citizens group known as the Municipal Art Patrons. Ulti-
mate responsibility for gallery policy rests with the general manager of the Municipal 
Arts Department. As a practical matter, however, most decisions are made at the gal-
lery level. See Los ANGELES, CAL., CHARTER§§ 165-66 (1975). 
7 I. The relationship of the Museum Associates and the county is described in sec-
tion 210.2 of the Los Angeles County Administrative Code, which states: "Subject to 
the supervision of the board of supervisors, the Department of the Museum of Art shall 
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governance makes in terms of a variety of values. First we must 
determine how important the form of governance is in preserving a 
tradition of independence and excellence in the museum's growth. Sec-
ond, we must establish to what extent the form of governance reflects 
the role of wealth in shaping the museum's programming and policy. 
Perhaps no changes are needed, but as part of its role in encouraging the 
arts in California, the council must look at the way museums are 
governed. 
Miscellaneous Issues 
An agenda of really important questions that touch on the role of 
the state in the arts is quite long, and the job that remains to be done is 
extensive. We must determine how the state can better use existing 
facilities to support the arts, how it can strengthen its graphic arts 
program, how it can ensure better access to auditoriums in state build-
ings for cultural activities, and how it can encourage a program of ticket 
subsidization that will make the purchase of tickets to theater, music, 
and dance events more feasible for those in low income groups. There 
should be more opportunity for the poor, the young, and the aged to 
attend signficant cultural events. 
Study should also focus on how the state can enhance the rights of 
artists, provide better information on contractual and tax issues, regulate 
relations with dealers and purchasers of works of art, and furnish 
technical assistance on issues such as copyright. Indeed, the California 
Arts Council might assist by strengthening service organizations · de-
be under the regulation and control of Museum Associates, a nonprofit corporation ... 
in all matters connected with the management, operation, and maintenance of the Los 
Angeles County Museum of Art." Los ANGELES CouNTY, CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 210.2. 
Thus the museum is a department of the county, the director is a department head, and 
the employees are considered employees of the county. 
Pursuant to a 1958 contract between the county and the Museum Associates, the 
county provided the land upon which the Museum Associates built the structures now 
comprising the museum. Those buildings, upon completion, were donated to the county. 
Again under the contract, the county delegated the responsibility for the "management, 
operation, maintenance, and regulation," of the museum to the board of directors of Mu-
seum Associates. Additionally, the county agreed to bear the cost of the operation and 
maintenance of the museum. Acquisitions, for the most part, are the responsibility of 
the Museum Associates and independent sources. 
Under the language of section 210.2 of the Los Angeles County Administrative 
Code, the board of supervisors would seem to have the authority to exercise some over-
sight concerning the operation of the museum. Functionally, however, that authority 
is only nominal, and the directors of Museum Associates operate as an autonomous body 
once they have received funding from the county. The board is self-perpetuating. See 
CAL, PUB. RES. CoDE §§ 5120-32 (West 1972). 
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signed to perform these functions for artists. Also, the state should 
strive to improve its contribution to the arts through its building pro-
gram. "Whoever builds an unsightly house," someone once wrote, 
"insults the community, wrongs his neighbors and detracts from the 
common weal." The State of California has too often built unsightly 
houses; some mechanism is needed to change the current policy. Be-
cause the state's construction program is so vast and varied, it can 
provide a significant contribution to the arts. The state must learn more 
about programs to segregate a small percentage of every construction 
budget for the arts and to ensure consideration of murals, public sculp-
ture, or other art forms in major new buildings. 72 It needs to know how 
to play a stronger part in historic landmark preservation. 7~ At present, 
local commissions, without adequate resources, are required to do a 
herculean job. Undoubtedly, more funds are needed to assist communi-
ties that seek to retain visible emblems of the past; but there is some-
thing even more specific that can be done by the arts council. Often, 
historic landmark buildings become artists' studios or the homes of art 
institutions, providing an economic base for the buildings' continued 
vitality. The council could adopt a guildeline encouraging the use of its 
resources for such indirect landmark preservation purposes. The recent-
ly passed Arts and Artifacts Indemnity Act74 was enacted without 
certain provisions, currently still in committee, which would provide 
operating funds for valuable institutions such as art museums, natural 
history museums, and maritime museums. Yet there will be fundamen-
tal problems with the Act even if these provisions are added. First and 
foremost , the funds available to California will not be sufficient to meet 
the pressing claims of the state's museums. Second, there will be 
difficult problems of definition involving the eligibility for federal sup-
port of particular institutions. Third, there will undoubtedly be concern 
about how the funds are used and to what kinds of museum programs 
they are applied. The state must be more fully aware of the issues 
involved in operating support for museums. Perhaps the state should 
submit amendments to the Brademas bill; perhaps it should develop its 
own museum services legislation. It is on this kind of issue that the 
advice of the California Arts Council could be invaluable. As the states 
become much more deeply involved in the patronage of the arts, there 
will be great need for interstate cooperation. The California Arts 
72. See Art and the Law, Apr.-May 1975, at I, cols. 1, 3. 
73-. See notes 22-23 & accompanying text supra. 
74. Act of Dec. 19, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-158, 94th Cong., (1975). 
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Council should work jointly with other state commissions, perhaps in a 
western consortium, per-haps with several of the major commissions such 
as that of New York. Certain arts enterprises are so major, in terms of 
planning, cost, and impact, that the coordinated operation of several 
state commissions would be warranted. 
Our system of charitable deductions is now the principal means of 
public support of the arts. 7u Yet there are those who are skeptical 
about the impact of this system.76 By relying on tax-induced contribu-
tion, we place the center of strength for our arts institutions with the 
rich. 77 It is their taste that becomes the museum's taste, and thence the 
community's. As a nation we have always depended on the bounty of 
the rich and the powerful to build our cultural institutions, but in this 
century, we have rewarded such gifts with generous tax savings. Per-
haps it is time t,hat we review our method of building public collections 
to determine whether more democratic means would yield institutions 
that are freer of idiosyncratic and individual taste. The California Arts 
Council could do a great public service by undertaking such an inquiry. 
Government has a role in encouraging the arts and providing a 
climate in which artists can create and market their works. Beyond that 
function, it may be difficult to justify direct aid to artists. The droit de 
75. Charitable contributions, particularly those of great size, are not "private"; 
they are part private and part governmental. As Karst put it, "when the public contrib-
utes [to charity] indirectly through such devices as tax exemptions, its stake in private 
philanthropy is . .. real." Karst, supra note 33, at 433-34. 
76. In terms of museums, the current system of federal subvention has aspects that 
are increasin_gly subject to scrutiny. One commentator has observed. "The amount of 
public funds which a private person can allocate depends on his marginal tax bracket 
and hence his income position and wealth generally." Surrey, suprn note 57, at 386. 
Another has remarked that the system is "undemocratic because it subsidizes 'much more 
heavily the charities favored by the wealthy as distinct from those appealing primarily 
to the poorer contributors.'" Rabin, Charitable Trusts anti Charitable Deductiom. 41 
N.Y.U.L REV. 912, 922 (1966), quoting Vickrey, One Economist's View of Philan-
thropy, in PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC POLICY 54 (F. Dickinson ed. 1962) . 
77. See H. CAHILL, NEW HORIZONS IN AMERICAN ART 35-38 (1941 ) . "The em-
phasis on masterpieces is primarily a collectors' idea and is related to a whole series 
of commercial magnifications which have very little to do with the needs of society 
... .'' Id. at 35. ''Our society today does not yet afford a life in which art is inti-
. mately connected with everyday vocations. Our democracy has not yet become the life 
of 'free and enriching communion' of which John Dewey speaks .... " Id. at 36. "I 
do not think that we have weighed sufficiently the meaning of the change from a handi-
craft to a machine method of production, probably the most revolutionary change in the 
history of human society. Its effect upon the arts has been catastrophic. It has di-
vorced the artist from the usual vocations of the community and has practically shut 
off the average man from the arts.'' Id. 
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suite is an example. 78 Art, at least some art, has appreciated in value, 
sometimes quite remarkably. Individual artists have considered it 
unacceptable that a purchaser should reap the profit, having purchased 
the art from the struggling artist for a pittance, or having purchased the 
work wisely for a sum that was not insignificant but turned out to be far 
below the market value a decade later. It is not certain that the 
government has a role to play in addressing the balance between pur-
chaser and seller of works of art. It is painful that Robert Rauschen-
berg is not sharing in Robert Scull's proceeds from the sale of the artist's 
works, but the pain is not of a sort that calls for government regulation 
as opposed to the working of the market place. On the other hand, the 
state can play a very constructive role in modifying existing decisional 
law which impedes the bargaining of artists in the market place. Re-
cently, for example, legislation addressed the judicial assumption that 
the sale of a tangible object customarily included with it transfer of 
rights to reproduce the object.79 
A state arts council might also be interested in intervening to help 
modulate the effect of one federal tax deduction on giving within the 
state. It appears, from the literature involving law and the arts,80 that 
the creator of paintings is somehow discriminated against by the Internal 
Revenue Code. There is no charitable deduction for a work of art given 
to a museum by its creator, except for a deduction for the cost of 
materials. A collector, of course, has the charitable deduction and 
often uses it prudently to minimize his tax obligation. 81 One reason 
78. Price, Go1·ernment Policy and Economic Security for Artists: The Case of the 
Droit de Suite, 77 YALE L.J. 1333 (1968) . 
79. For example, in Pushman v. New York Graphic Soc'y, the court refused to 
grant an injunction against reproduction of an uncopyrighted painting where the artist 
who sold it "took no steps to withhold or control that right." Pushman v. New York 
Graphic Soc'y, 287 N .Y . 302, 308, 39 N.E.2d 249, 251 (1942) . Subsequently the New 
York legislature declared that the right of reproduction remains with the artist "unless 
such right is sooner expressly transferred by an instrument, note, or memorandum in 
writing signed by the owner of the right . ... " N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 224 (McKin-
ney 1968) ; accord, Cal. Stat. 1975, ch. 952, §§ 1-2, at 2407-09. 
80. See, e.g., F. FELDMAN & s. WEIL, ART Wons : I...Aw, POLICY, PRACTICE 823-
24 (1974). 
81. But is this really so absurd a set of circumstances? Generally, the producer 
of an object, someone who devoted his labor in · creating the finished product, cannot 
deduct the fair market value of the contribution. See INT. REV. CooE OF 1954, § 170(e) ; 
Treas. Reg. § § 1.170 A-l(g), 1.170 A-4. A lawyer cannot deduct the office value 
of a memorandum which he has contributed; a housepainter cannqt deduct the value of 
refinishing the local church; a boy scout leader cannot deduct the valµe of the hours 
donated to improving the quality of America's youth. Presidents cannot deduct the 
value of their letters ; musicians can no longer deduct the value of their scores. Thus, 
there is not discrimination against artists as artists. Even if there were discrimination, 
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that the deduction should be reinstated is to give artists an incentive to 
make gifts to museums, and here the state interest seems clear, since it is 
the public at large that is affected. A committee of the New York City 
Bar has prepared a study of the effects on donations of the 1969 
amendment to the tax laws and has concluded that the deleterious 
impact on contributions by creators has been substantial indeed.82 That 
determination, of course, raises questions concerning the way in which 
the government wishes to develop public collections of the works of 
living artists: Is the deduction a suitable mechanism for encouraging the 
process? Or are direct grants to the artist, or grants to the museum for 
purchase, more effective methods?83 
Zoning and housing for artists is also a matter for public con-
cern. 84 It has been the fate of the artists, quite often, to be the stalking 
horse for the middle class in the improvement of neighborhoods. By 
way of perhaps undue generalization, it may be said that artists have 
been proficient at finding pleasant but inexpensive places, areas that are 
more or less rundown, and then, by their presence there, upgrading such 
areas, often through individual rehabilitative efforts. The cycle is 
defeating. Improvement yields demand, which pushes prices higher. 
The artists have destroyed their habitats through their own care. A 
society that seeks to encourage the arts and to have a subculture of 
painters, musicians, and actors must ensure that a place to work and live 
is not denied. There is an assumption here that artists are a little like 
wildlife: they cannot thrive in antiseptic and wonderfully controlled 
climates, subdivisions with houses all in a row. There is the additional 
assumption that the kind of area where artists can live and work will die 
without the direct effort of the state. 
Ensuring that there is a demand for the services of artists~5 is an 
it would not be clear that the answer lies in restoring the full fair market value deduction 
to the artists. Perhaps it would be more equitable to destroy the deduction altogether, 
or at least to eliminate the deduction for the appreciated value of an object. 
82. See 30 RECORD OF N .Y.C.B.A. 586 (1975). 
83. Artists, or artists' groups, are fairly single-minded on this question, and well 
they might be. What is painful is not the effort to obtain a tax break, but the righteous-
ness involved in the effort. 
84. Cf. CAL. WELF. & INST'Ns CODE§§ 5115-16 (West 1972 & Supp. 1975). 
85. In the 1940's, the founder of the Work Projects Administration arts project 
wrote: "For the first time in American art history a direct and sound relationship has 
been established between the -American public and the artist. Community organizations 
of all kinds have asked for his work. In the discussions and interchanges between the 
artist and the public concerning murals, easel paintings, prints and sculptures for public 
buildings, through the arrangements for allocations of art in many forms to schools and 
libraries, an active and often very human relationship has been created. The artist has 
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appropriate goverpment role. Undisturbed, the market does not pro-
vide extraordinary incentives for being a serious and creative person, a 
writer, a poet, or a painter. The question is whether the government 
can provide more paid positions that afford occupational legitimacy to 
these roles. What is suggested is a movement away from the grant and 
award approach, in which the artist is treated like a prized orchid, 
nourished and protected. Rather, the government should play, in part, 
the same role that the church and the throne played in patronizing 
artists. Artists should be hired the way landscapers, decorators, or 
architects are hired to work on state construction probjects. Large 
bureaucracies, such as the Health and Welfare Department of the State 
of California, should hire poets or painters who would do their own 
engineering studies of how to improve the spirit of the state office 
worker. There should be artists in residence in schools of law and 
dentistry. There should quite clearly be artists employed in the elemen-
tary and secondary school classrooms. These should be artists being 
artists, inside critics of the madness of complacency, not artists who are 
hired simply to teach painting or how to read a play. 
This welter of issues should not obscure an underlying commit-
ment to a significant and creative role for the state. A society cannot be 
great without a strong and pluralistic commitment to the arts. The 
arts help to bring order to our lives. They provide us with a sense of 
perspective. They enhance our perception of the relations of men and 
women to each other and to their society. The arts help our people to 
communicate with each other; they help to provide a record of our 
society. What are really at stake are new and stronger ways of enchanc-
ing our humanity, our sense of the grand and the good, our reaching 
for harmony and order and hope. A century ago, Andrew Downing 
wrote that "every outward material fonn is a symbol" that "acts upon 
the sense of beauty." In our society, the outward material forms have 
proliferated, and the sense of beauty has sometimes been dulled. 
become aware of every type of community demand for art, and has had the prospect 
of increasingly larger audiences, of greatly extended public interest. There has been at 
least the promise of a broader and socially sounder base for American art .... " H. 
CAHILL, NEW HORIZONS IN AMERICAN ART 29 (1941 ). 
